International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, Anaheim, Vereinigte Staaten

Abbrevation

HOST

Link

http://www.engr.uconn.edu/HOST/

City

Anaheim

Country

United States

Deadline Paper

2008-04-18

Start Date

2008-06-09

End Date

2008-06-09

Abstract

Theme: Trojan Detection and Isolation Chip design and fabrication is becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious activities and alternations with globalization. This has raised serious concerns regarding possible threats to military systems, financial infrastruc–tures and even household appliances. An adversary can introduce a Trojan designed to disable and/or destroy a system at some future time (Time Bomb) or the Trojan may serve to leak confidential information covertly to the adversary. Trojans can be implemented as hardware modifications to ASICs, COTS, microprocessors, or DSPs, or as firmware modifications, e.g., to FPGA bitstreams. Trojans are cleverly concealed to prevent accidental discovery during validation and manufacturing test. Therefore, existing Keywords: <TABLE id=AutoNumber2 style=″BORDER–COLLAPSE: collapse″ borderColor=#bcd0dc cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width=″91%″ border=1> <TBODY> <TR> <TD vAlign=top width=″52%″> Trojan detection and isolation Authenicating foundry of origin Side channel analysis/attacks Watermarking IP security/FPGA design security Cryptographic techniques for hardware security </TD> <TD vAlign=top width=″48%″> Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) Embedded and distributed systems security Hardware intrusion detection and prevention Security engineering Scan–chain encryption </TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>